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Turkey Probing a New Model in the 1990s
A nna  L ea nd er
Abstract
Since the 1991 elections which brought a coalition between the centre right and 
the social democratic party to power, Turkey has shifted to a new economic 
policy model which attaches more importance to redistribution. It gives more 
weight to farmers, employees and small firms, partially at the expense of large 
private firms. This paper deals with the question whether this policy is 
sustainable considering the constraints of international competition and the 
political influence of the business community in Turkey. We will argue that 
there is considerable leeway for choice. Although it is not possible to avoid the 
pressures from the international economy, the government can decide how to 
distribute the costs of living with them. A "welfarist policy" policy could be 
compatible with the imperatives of international competition. However, the 
opposition of Turkish businessmen, who have a growing political and economic 
influence through the liberal economic policies of the 1980s. might wreck 
Çiller's Robin Hood strategy.
In March 1993, an International Labour Organization delegation visited Turkey 
for the first time ever. The reason was that Turkey had engaged itself to make 
its trade union and collective bargaining legislation conform with the ILO 
agreements (n° 87, 98, 151, 154).1 This is a victory for the Turkish 
Confederation of Trade-unions and the Social Democratic Party (SHP) who 
have been pressing for this decision throughout the 1980s. Work slow-downs, 
massive health-clinic visits, shaved-head and barefoot campaigns have produced 
their result. The adherence to the ILO agreement is an indication of a more 
general trend. It is one of the steps marking the end of an economic policy 
favouring the Turkish holdings.2 It is one of the measures contributing to the 
emergence of a "new model."
There are many reasons for arguing that the new policies are likely to 
remain empty promises or to cause substantial difficulties if implemented Their 
compatibility with international competitiveness, the reaction of foreign 
investors and international creditors and of the holdings in Turkey are likely to 
be problematic. Therefore, the Turkish government might be heading straight 




























































































to the demands of private business whose collaboration is necessary for 
continued economic growth and exports. On the other hand, it has to give 
priority to redistribution in favour of farmers, employees and small firms to 
preserve its legitimacy. It is not the first time Turkey encounters the difficulty 
of reconciling redistributive demands with the requirements of international 
competition and private firm development. Judging from past this experience, 
the prospects seem gloomy. In the late 1950s, 1960s and 1970s similar 
dilemmas were among the causes of political and economic chaos which 
eventually led to military interventions (27 May 1961, 12 March 1971, 12 
September 1980) and to authoritarian regimes which resolved the dilemma, from 
above, by limiting distribution.3
The contention of this paper is that the dilemma need result neither in 
political and economic chaos nor in military intervention. We will first show 
that démocratisation made an a more welfarist economic policy difficult to 
avoid. It proved impossible to undertake it without encroaching the privileges 
of the holdings. We will then show that this policy is compatible with the 
international constraints. The imperatives of international competition and the 
conditionality of international creditors do not exclude welfarist policies. Rather, 
the international competition is used as a black mail on local policy-making. 
Finally, the feasibility of the model hinges on the reaction of the business 
community. A stable economy and continued growth are prerequisites for 
managing the international imperatives. Consequently, business and the state 
have to be "partners in production."4 Moreover, private business’ influence over 
economic policy-making which has grown with the internationalisation of the 
economy, renders business backing indispensable also politically.
1. The Adoption of a New Model
In Turkey, as in other countries, elections put pressure on politicians to improve 
the redistributive and social aspects of their economic policies. In the initial 
phase of transition to democracy the pressure is minor. Moderate right wing 
governments often play a key role in meditating the transition from military 
regimes to democracy since they are the only (or most acceptable) interlocutors 
of the military.5 However, in Turkey as elsewhere, the restoration of democracy 
opens the political scene to groups initially excluded and consequently also to 
group stressing income equality. Thus, a look at Turkey in the late 1980s 
reveals the difficulty for^ie  right as well as the left to resist distributional 



























































































Turkey Probing a New Model ? 3
program of the DYP-SHP6 coalition in 1991. The coalition intended to soothe 
the growing dissatisfaction of these groups without hurting the privileges of 
private business. The idea was to build on the ANAP heritage, but to introduce 
measures making it more sensitive to distribution. Only when the original plan 
failed did the government take a clear stand against the holdings. It adopted a 
new model.
The ANAP heritage
Turgut Ozal’s economic policies, starting with the. 24 January 1980 structural 
adjustment program,7 had transformed the import substituting Turkish economy 
of the 1970s to an outward oriented one. In so doing it had consolidated the 
privileges of the holdings in the Turkish economy. The way that export 
promotion, import liberalisation and financial liberalisation had been designed 
and implemented advantaged large firms. The ANAP handed over an economy 
where private businessmen, and particularly the large ones, were accustomed to 
a privileged position which it seemed difficult to challenge.
Large firms were advantaged by the way export promotion had been 
designed and implemented.8 Because of the skills and the capital required, large 
firms dominate exports everywhere. In Turkey, the organization of the export 
promotion scheme reinforced this domination. Export subsidies were reserved 
for exports exceeding specified amounts. Moreover, a considerable part of the 
export incentives went to the Export Capital Companies (£>7$ created in July 
1980), modeled on the Korean Trading Houses. The DT§ were to increase 
exports by making infrastructure and information available to affiliated firms. 
The central idea was to make exports easier for smaller firms. However, the 
DT§ were often formed by large firms who used the special advantages 
pertaining to the status. To be able to comply with the requirements for the 
DT§ status these took over a large share of smaller firms’ exports.9 This 
practice increased exports by small firms, but also redirected export incentives 
from small firms to the larger ones.10 When in 1988 the scheme was 
reorganized as a result of the numerous abuses and international pressure, and 
placed under the control of the EXIMBANK, only the DT§ were permitted to 
retain the special status and incentive scheme.11 Finally, the extensive abuse 
of the export incentives functioned as a subsidy for large firms.12
Similarly, the liberalization of the imports was less difficult for the 
"holdings." The holdings enjoyed the advantage of a more technology intensive 




























































































wider range of activities which made it possible to transfer losses from one firm 
to others in the same group. Moreover, the size of the holdings made permitted 
them to fall back on or diversifying into more profitable activities. The 
liberalization of imports also hit the holding selectively. It was delayed in many 
sectors apparently because of political pressure of large firms.13 Finally, the 
liberalization was less drastic than often thought. A considerable reduction in 
nominal tariff rates masked constant or raising effective protection. According 
to one study effective protection rates rose from 80% to 93% in manufacturing 
between 1983 and 1988 with considerable variations among sub-sectors.14 
Levies for the Extra Budgetary Funds (EBFs) were responsible for this 
development. The number of goods subjected to such levies increased from 40 
to 1400 between 1983 and 1988.15
Finally, the holdings benefited from the financial liberalisation. Financial 
liberalisation, in particular the deregulation of the foreign exchange operations 
and the creation of the Istanbul stock exchange have opened new fields of 
financial operations, where large benefits can be drawn.16 These measures 
affected above all the large economic groups including banks and individuals 
with capital to invest. Since it has become easier to establish new banks 
nationally as well as with foreign partners, large economic groups that did not 
include banks earlier have now set up their own banks. Of 25 private Turkish 
banks operating in 1990, 8 had been established after 1980. Of 23 foreign or 
partly foreign owned banks with branches in Turkey or incorporated there, 19 
were established after 1980.17 The government was generous to holdings 
facing difficulties as a consequence of the liberalization. This was common 
because of the high debt to equity ratio in Turkey which makes firms vulnerable 
to changes in interests and exchange rates. Consequently, the state bailed out 
many firms, state banks took over private firm debt through a part of the shares. 
Table 1 gives some illustrations of this practice.
In short, during the ANAP decade "large conglomerates have been happy 
with—or quiet about—the details of the economic policies in the 1980s [...] 
industrial firms outside the conglomerates have complained bitterly [...] internal 
oriented industrial groups have been weary of import liberalization [...] export 
oriented medium sized firms have campaigned against the privileged status of 
the exporting houses.18"
The Shift to Robin Hood Politics



























































































Turkey Probing a New Model ? 5
Tôbank Ziraat, Halk and Emlak Bank become partners 21.4.1983
TOE (OYAK) Ziraat Bank took over all the shares of the firm 1984





80% of the shares taken over by various banks 2.10.1989
Narin Holding 68% of the shares were taken over by various 
banks
13.7.1988
Ak G übre incorporated in state oil-firm 9.1.1988
Izdas I§ Bankasi took over part of the side firms 
Izmir Demir (Jelik (20%), Agir Qelik (40%)
18.11.1988
Erzincan Gida 99,8% of shares bought by Et ve Balik 
Kurumu
3.3.1990
Meta§ Five Banks took over shares and 27 other froze 
the debt of the firm for 8 years
14.3.1990
Beslen Makarna TMO bought 41% of the shares 8.4.1991
Vestel State Banks provided 70 bn. TL credit 7.1.1991
Pinar Et KOI gave a 30 bn. TL credit 1.1.1991
Paktasj Taken over by the state 9.6.1991
Asil Çelik (Koç) I§ Bank took over shares and the firm was 
given a special status
Güney Sanayii 
(Sapmaz)
Siimerbank and Ziraat Bank became partners
Source: Cumhuriyet Hafta 5-11.3.1993, based on research by Izak Atiyas and Mustafa 
Sonmez, Kirk Haramiler. Tiirkiye’de Holdingler (Istanbul: Ozlem Yayincilik, 1987), pp. 
145-7.
Table 1. Bail-outs through Government Intervention
not mean to challenge the privileges of the holdings. On the contrary, it 
intended to pursue the main lines of the ANAP economic policy while 
correcting the worst social inequities of liberalisation. The coalition’s strategy 
to achieve this goal was to increase transfers and to alleviate the tax-pressure 
on the groups that had been ignored and disadvantaged during the preceding 




























































































Economic Enterprises (SEE), reorganizing the Extra Budgetary Fund System, 
and by making tax collection more effective. However, this strategy turned out 
to be infeasible and the coalition had to reconsider its policies in a way that 
infringed on the privileges of the large economic groups.
The first group the coalition promised redistributive measures was the 
farmers. Agriculture continues to employ some 50% of Turkey’s active 
population. The sector had been largely left out by the ANAP. It had been 
"forgotten."20 Real income of farmers had eroded in the course of the 1980s. 
Between 1980 and 1986 the buying power of the agricultural support prices 
(support prices/general price index) had declined by 20% and compared to 1977 
the decline was of 40%.21 The situation improved after 1987, mainly for 
electoral reasons. In the areas where the DYP was challenging ANAP (for 
instance the tobacco growing Manisa region), subsidized agricultural support 
prices were increased.22 ANAP was criticized more for its insufficient efforts 
to modernize agriculture than for its low support prices. The GAP project 
(South Anatolian Development Project) which had been aimed at developing 
irrigation and agro-industries around the dam constructions, was the only sign 
to the contrary. However, within the GAP, the translation of the investment into 
local agricultural activities remained the least clear part of the project.23 Thus, 
increased availability of credits and encouragement of agro-industries figured 
on both DYP and SHP projects.
The second group the coalition promised a better treatment was wage- 
earners, including public employees. According to the State Planning 
Organization the real wage losses between 1983 and 1987 were 25,7% in the 
public sector and 14,8% in the private sector. However, Sevket Yilmaz, the 
leader of Turk Is,24 estimated that the losses were much higher reaching some 
50% in the private sector.25 Even though real wages ceased to fall after 1987 
they remained stagnant until the end of the decade.26 Moreover, the taxation 
system had sanctioned wage-earners. Extensive tax evasion by self-employed 
had made public sector employees the main contributors of direct taxes. 
Because of tax evasion the government relied heavily on indirect taxes. Indirect 
taxes constitute over 30% of fiscal receipts and together with other taxes 
(mainly fund premiums) they make up 45%. The fund premiums exacerbated 
the impression of wage earners to be disadvantaged. The "encouragement to 
savings" premium e.g. was resented as a plight for employees with wages that 
hardly covered current expenses.27
However, the plans for improving the situation of these groups without 



























































































Turkey Probing a New Model ? 1
Like their predecessors, the coalition governments found privatization easier to 
design than to carry out.28 The SEEs continue to be a burden rather than a 
source of income. The body that should have supervised the privatization 
process, the Turkish Autonomisation, Restructuring and Privatization Board 
(TOYOK), has not been able to function because of the resistance of the 
ministries concerned and the slow parliament vote on the definition of its 
competencies.29 Moreover, disagreements on the procedure, notably the use of 
block sales and sales to foreign buyers, has hampered the process. 
Consequently, in 1992 only TL 5.000 bn. of the planned TL 7.000 bn. 
privatization revenue could be collected. At the same time, the SEEs deficit 
planned to some TL 26.000 bn. reached TL 40.000 bn.30
Likewise, the transfer of the resources held by the Extra Budgetary Funds 
(EBFs) to the government budget has brought less than expected. The funds 
were originally created for collecting and organizing "extra-budgetary" transfers. 
This was a way of escaping control. The de-budgetization made it difficult for 
internal and external observers to perceive the exact nature and size of the 
flows. However, by the end of the 1980s the funds began to escape the control 
of the government itself. One of the plans of the DYP-SHP coalition was 
therefore to regain control over the EBFs and to consolidate their revenues in 
the budget. Although the revenues have been collected in a common fund 
account at the Central Bank, giving the Treasury and the Ministry of Finance 
direct control over their use, they have not been fully consolidated.31 The 
Economist Intelligence Unit estimates that there are 171 EBFs with some TL 
70.000 bn income. Instead of consolidating all funds, only 77 were integrated 
into the budget in 1992. This piecemeal approach left out the most important 
EBFs. Only TL 17.000 bn. of the 70.000 bn. EBF income was made available.
Finally, the attempt to increase government income through amnesties have 
failed. By conceding generous conditions to persons with unpaid taxes and debts 
(only a small share of the amounts due had to be paid), the government hoped 
that the debtors would be encouraged to reimburse their debts and pay their 
taxes. However, the strategy did not work. Amnesties on debts of farmers to the 
Ziraat bank, and of the self-employed to the Bag-Kur (which provides pensions 
and health-care to the self-employed) brought a mere TL 3.000 bn. instead of 
the planned TL 15.500 bn.
To compensate for the failure of raising revenues through more effective tax 
collection, privatization and the transfer of EBFs the coalition has turned to 
other means. Launching of titles both on the market and directly to the public 




























































































(passed in March 1993). Since the aim has been reducing inequities the reform 
aimed partly at making self-employed and corporations contribute more. The 
political dimension of the law is seen in a provision which will allow the 
publication of the names of tax evaders. The exemption and deduction 
possibilities for corporations have been reduced. Moreover, the governments has 
threatened to discontinue the practice of making tax-amnesties every two years. 
Finally, the control will be stricter and penalties for evasion more severe. The 
ministry of finance has received 25.000 supplementary employees to insure the 
effective implementation of the law.32
The government has been pushed to take measures which go against the 
large cooperations, precisely in a way it initially intended to avoid. Its attempt 
at continuity has failed. It has adopted a "new model" for the economy where 
the privileged position of the groups is put into question. The tax-reform came 
together with other political signals such the legalization of the DISK33 and the 
relaxation of the restrictions on trade union activities. Together they have 
created a situation where the government is increasingly in opposition to the 
holdings. The "Turkish iron-lady" (Ms. (filler, prime-minister of the second 
coalition government) is trying "Robin Hood politics."34 The question is if this 
policy is compatible with the imperatives of international competitiveness and 
if it is politically feasible.
2. International Competition as Domestic Black-Mail
Turkish holdings have complained bitterly against welfarist polices because they 
impair their competitiveness. They have argued that higher tax-burdens, wages 
raises and union rights are incompatible with the international constraints on the 
economy. We will argue that the use of international competitiveness is a 
largely unjustified black-mail. The three most common assertions are that the 
new policies are incompatible with Turkey’s international imperatives because 
they: (i) endanger the competitiveness of exports and the related success of an 
export oriented economic strategy; (ii) make it difficult to attract foreign 
investors; (iii) are impossible because of the conditionality imposed by 
international creditors. We will see that these arguments are not persuasive. The 
success of exports promotion and the capacity to attract foreign investments are 
determined by a complex set of factors of which low labour costs, tax 
regulation and union activities are only a small part. Moreover, because of its 
strategic importance, creditors were exceptionally generous to Turkey during the 



























































































of adjustment. They are not responsible for the social costs of the policies.
Promoting Exports
The claim that redistribution is incompatible with the international 
competitiveness of exports is familiar from developed countries where it is used 
to justify "belt-tightening" policies. However, also "the NICs risk losing their 
competitive edge because their labour is no longer very cheap when compared 
with less industrialized countries."35 In Turkey, the fear that increased wages 
and taxation of firms will reduce international competitiveness is central in the 
debate around the new DYP-SHP policy model. Businessmen argue that 
increased taxation erodes competitiveness directly by increasing costs and 
indirectly by reducing the margins for investments. They oppose the revision 
of the legislation on unions on the grounds that increased labour costs will 
erode their competitiveness (internally and externally). Besides the fact that 
Turkish unions are painfully aware of the need to restrain labour costs and 
consequently, unlikely to send them sky-rocketing, we will argue that even if 
wages and taxation did rise it might not harm the competitiveness of Turkish 
exports fundamentally.
The cost of labour and the tax-burden are only two of many factors in the 
international competitiveness of firms. Organization of production, services 
related to sales and access to markets are at least as important. Firstly, 
technological progress has made it difficult for labour to compete with machines 
in most sectors. The increasing capital intensiveness of production is reducing 
the weight of labour in total costs. It has even been argued that the existence 
of low technology sectors is a myth with little relation to production realities.36 
Second, it is not enough to make a cheap product, the product has to be 
marketable in terms of design and quality. Thus, production systems allowing 
for "quick and flexible response" to changes in demand, are important not only 
for reducing the costs of stocks but also for avoiding misdirected production. 
This type of production strategy typically involves the use of multi-function 
machines and an integrated relation with the market. It relies more on the 
development of skills than on the maintenance of low wages.37 Lastly, the 
product has to reach the market. In the current protectionist environment, this 
entails political agreements for overcoming protective barriers, or relying on 
counter-trade and intra-firm trade to overcome duties and quotas.
Turkey Probing a New Model ? 9
Cheap labour has not sufficed to sustain comparative advantage in any other than 




























































































spinning and weaving, the leading sector in the 1960s Korea, Taiwan and other
late-industrializing countries.38
A look at Turkey’s main export sector (textiles39) confirms the importance 
of factors other than labour costs.40 The factors behind export expansion were 
not primarily linked to low costs in the sector. Although the semi-informal, sub­
contracting market of small work-shops is an important part of textile Turkish 
production,41 wages in the sector are high relative to those of other developing 
countries.42 Rather political decisions and primarily the competitive 
devaluations of the Turkish lira43 and the negotiation of favourable quota 
agreements providing protection against competition from lower wage countries 
were essential. Moreover, the transnational technological and organizational 
developments advantaged Turkey by making the geographical proximity of 
Turkey to the EC markets a major asset. Turkish firms can participate in 
delocalized just-in-time productions.44 The significance of policy making and 
technology is reflected in the activities of the professional (employers’) 
associations who spend most of their attention and effort on these issues.45
In short, labour costs and tax-burden are only part what makes firms 
competitive internationally. Exchange rates, market access, and technological 
developments have been argued to be more important. Even in the labour 
intensive textile sector we have seen that limiting labour costs is only one (and 
not the most central) preoccupation of the professional employers associations. 
The argument that wage increases and unionization rights harm international 
competitiveness could even be turned on its head: wage increases might 
encourage firms to invest in more efficient equipment, rendering the transition 
to new production organizations and techniques necessary for long term 
international competitiveness quicker.
Attracting Foreign Investors
The risk that foreign investors will be discouraged is a second black-mail 
against the SHP-DYP coalition’s welfarist policies. The argument of the Turkish 
businessmen is that foreign investors, crucial for international competitiveness 
in an increasingly global economy, will shy a country with high labour costs. 
However, the attractiveness of a country to foreign investors is not linked to 
taxation and labour legislation alone or even primarily. Other factors are far 
more important. This is particularly true in Turkey where the bulk of foreign 
investment is aiming at the local market and consequently not motivated 



























































































Turkey Probing a New Model ? 11
It is of course impossible to generalize the motives of firms investing 
abroad, however, wages and taxation regulation play a reduced role.46 Some 
foreign investors delocalize production to reduce labour costs. But even in these 
cases the decision of where to invest is influenced by a host of other factors, 
including cultural affinity, macro-economic environment, geographical location 
and political stability.47 A large part of foreign investment is made in services 
or to access to markets or raw materials.48 Labour costs are significant for 
neither. When the aim is local market shares high wages may even be an 
advantage since demand will be higher. Lastly, some authors would argue that 
the significance of labour costs in investments decisions is disappearing with the 
passage to "systemo-facture," or post-Fordism.
TNCs are unlikely to utilise developing country production platforms for the 
world market to the same extent as during the past two decades, since both the 
new economics and politics of production lead to the optimum location being at 
the point of the final market.49
The limited significance of labour costs in foreign investment decisions is 
reflected in the way that foreign investments are distributed internationally. The 
lion share of foreign investments goes to developed economies (75-80%) where 
labour costs are the highest and taxation the most developed. Moreover, 86% 
of the foreign investment to developing countries is absorbed by 18 countries, 
most of whom are NICs with relatively high labour costs.50
A cursory look at foreign investments in Turkey confirms that low costs 
have not been central to the increase in foreign investments since 1980 nor to 
the activities of investors already in Turkey. The foreign firms established 
during the import substituting period (mostly in manufacturing) have failed to 
develop exports. New investors in manufacturing, except in textiles and ready 
wear, continue to produce for the local market.51 Moreover, a large share of 
new foreign investment is concentrated in services (70% of firms and 45% of 
the capital) which are neither labour intensive and which have among the 
highest wages in Turkey. Financial services (banking mainly) and tourism 
attract most of the capital (74% of investments in services) and trade attracts the 
largest number of firms (60%). Finally, investors who have to limit costs can 
always establish themselves in the export processing zones where employers are 
exempted from taxation and social security premiums.52
The Turkish experience confirms that of most developing countries wishing 
to attract foreign investors: tax-regulations, low wages and restrictions on unions 




























































































particularly anxious to restrict unions or keep labour costs low. On the contrary, 
in many cases foreign firms prefer to work with unions and do not mind high 
wage levels provided they work for the local protected market.53 In Turkey 
foreign firms paid better salaries on average than Turkish firms in the same 
activities.54 Therefore the black-mail that low wages and restrictions are 
necessary to attract foreign investors seems of doubtful validity.
Satisfying International Creditors
A third argument used against the the coalition government’s welfarist 
economic policy intentions is that they are impossible because they are 
incompatible with the demands of international (private and public) creditors. 
Since Turkey is heavily dependent on foreign finance, creditors have 
considerable influence.55 This decisions implies that the creditors’ wishes have 
to be respected and particularly those of the World Bank and the IMF. The 
conclusion drawn is that policies of the type the new coalition is trying are 
excluded. However, we will argue that even following the "Washington 
consensus," there is room for policy decisions.56 Cuts in public spending can 
be done in different ways, taxation of private business is not excluded, and 
wages can be allowed to rise.
Conditionality sets a frame within which the policies have to fall. 
International creditors, private banks as well as multilateral institutions, are 
primarily concerned that debts be serviced. Conditionality is therefore 
essentially designed to make this possible, that is to insure stable exchange rates 
and budget equilibria which allow countries to meet their international 
obligations. In the case of the structural adjustment loans this went together 
with a more ambitious conception of conditionality which should be used to 
force the liberalisation of the economy as a whole. However, whether imposed 
in relation to debt difficulties or in relation to structural adjustment, loans 
conditionality is a liberal frame for economic policy. It.does not exclude union 
rights, increased salaries, or more effective taxation. On the contrary, 
conditionality often imposes reforms aiming at more effective social welfare 
schemes, usually redirecting them to cover the weakest social groups.57
Moreover, the frame set by conditionality is flexible. Neither the World 
Bank, nor the IMF, nor private bankers advocate support for the private sector 
at all costs. They would certainly not oppose a government which tried to 
reduce its budget deficits and inflation by limiting patrimonial practices such as 



























































































Turkey Probing a New Model ? 13
international financial institutions force governments to cut social expenditures 
when they are imposing cuts to limit the budgetary deficits. On the contrary, 
they usually encourage effective taxation schemes (also directed at private 
business) as a way of improving "domestic resource mobilisation." Moreover, 
they would be unlikely to oppose cuts in other parts of the budget than the 
social one. Military expenditure which have increased with the civil war in the 
South East and subsidies to public firms for instance seem highly relevant in the 
Turkish context.
SAL (US$ m) Key Conditionality
I: March 1980 
(275)
Export promotion (credits, insurance, de-bureaucratisation, plan 
reduced protection); Establish criteria for selecting public 
investment priorities; domestic resource mobilization (fiscal 




Export promotion (exchange rates, credits, de-bureaucratisation); 
Import liberalization (quota list items placed on licence list); 
domestic resource mobilization (strengthen tax administration, 
reduced tax on financial transaction, VAT planned); Public 
investment reoriented to infrastructure; SEE reform allowing 
autonomous pricing but no productivity increasing measures.
III: May 1982 
(304,8)
SEE reform, limits on budgetary transfers and reform decree of 
May 1983; reduced share of public investment in manufacturing 
SEEs, number of projects reduced; import liberalisation.
IV: June 1983 
(300,8)
Import liberalisation continued; public investments further 
reduced and rationalised; reduction in financial transactions tax 
to encourage resource mobilisation.
V: June 1984 
(376)
Import liberalisation pursued but increasing use of fund levies; 
energy plan to be implemented with WB ($375 m) sectoral loan; 
debt management improved; financial sector reform the creation 
of the Istanbul Stock Exchange.
Source: Mosley et al., Aid and Power, London & New York: Routledge, 1991 p. 20-25. 
Table 2. Conditionality on Turkey’s Structural Adjustment Loans
If it is true that conditionality leaves government considerable choice in 
general this is even more true in Turkey which has skilfully used its position 
as a stable ally of the West in a turbulent and increasingly religious Middle 
East.58 Turkey’s thus became the case for proving the validity of the 




























































































conditionality was accordingly softened. For Turkey,
Conditionality was predominantly qualitative in character, with ’satisfactory 
progress’ in implementing reform measures in designated areas being used to
justify a further extension of lending.... The realization that Turkey was a test
case and that the World Bank had a major commitment to the success of the 
program obviously influenced the Government’s perception of the strategic 
options available.59
Moreover, the sequencing, content and evaluation of Turkish conditionality 
made it easy for Turkey (table 2). Import liberalisation was put last on the list 
of requirements, while export promotion, de-regulation, the rationalisation of 
public spending (criteria for defining priority projects and planning) and 
financial liberalisation were put first. The initial import liberalisation was only 
the replacement of quotas with licences. The conditionality was loosely enough 
formulated for Turkish policy-makers to decide on how to implement the 
measures. Finally, the evaluations of the international institutions were 
uncommonly generous. ’The Fund felt sufficiently committed to the Turkish 
experiment to keep extremely quiet in 1983 when it was revealed that the then 
Turkish finance minister had doctored statistics showing the growth of currency 
in circulation.’60
Turkey’s position as a model further increased the government’s possiblity 
to make political choices, since it made new private and multilateral credits 
available. The inflows of fresh credits made it possible to go through the 
adjustment process without cutting public spending. Saraqoglu, former chief of 
the Central Bank, comments in retrospect
regardless of how strong the program was, our adjustment efforts would not 
have been successful without the necessary balance of payments financing. Both 
the Fund and the Bank provided very sizable assistance to Turkey in support of 
our program [...] In addition to balance of payments loans from the Fund and the 
Bank, Turkey received assistance in the form of debt relief and debt 
rescheduling from the OECD consortium and private creditors.61
The soft conditionality and generous loans underscores the responsibility of 
the government for the decision of how to distribute the costs of the adjustment, 
i.e. to support the holdings while impairing employees, farmers and self- 
employed. Conditionality surely biased the choice. It insisted on certain 
measurers (the privatization program, devaluation, public sector rationalization). 
Moreover, the structural adjustment program increased the importance of private 



























































































Turkey Probing a New Model ? 15
Conditionality contributed to determine and change the politically feasible 
choices of the government. However, the alternative of pursuing more liberal 
wage and union policies remained. It is insufficient to put the responsibility (or 
credit) for the policies pursued on international conditionality.
In short, policies repressing unions and limiting wage increases were not 
essential either for satisfying international creditors, for preserving the 
competitiveness of Turkish exports, or for attracting foreign investors. A simple 
outside-in determinism is not tenable. The Turkish government made policy 
choices according to its priorities, although as all policy choices, they were 
made under international and national constraints. It is therefore difficult to 
accept the reference to the imperatives of international competition as sufficient 
for rejecting the Turkish coalition government’s welfarist economic policies.
3. The Business of Policy-Making
Although the need to export, to attract foreign investors and obtain credits does 
not preclude redistributive policies directly it does make them conditional on the 
support of private business. In this section we will show that support from 
national and international business, and primarily of the large Turkish holdings, 
is decisive for the future of the welfarist Turkish economic policy. The 
internationalisation of the economy and the liberal economic policies have 
placed private business at the centre of policy-making. Private firms are central 
to the Turkish economy and therefore have to be "partners" in any economic 
policy. Moreover, they have an extensive and growing influence on policy­
making and on the legitimacy of economic policies. Therefore it is difficult to 
pursue economic policies which go against the large holdings.
The Private Sector as Partners in Production
The degree to which the government can take and carry through economic 
policy decisions is linked to the collaboration of private business. In a market 
economy the government needs private firms as much as the private firms need 
the government. They have to be "partners in production." Even staunch 
opponents of private profiteering and commercial activities, such as the 
revolutionary Ayathollas in Iran, remain lenient with businessmen to keep the 
economy turning.62 If private businessmen refuse to invest, to produce, to 
export, to follow the rules and the incentives set up by the government, the 




























































































and the private sector has been reinforced by the liberal economic policies in 
the 1980s and by the globalization of the economy.63
Turkey is no exception in this respect. The private sector has grown in 
importance with the liberalization in the 1980s. Private firms produce the bulk 
of goods and services. The public sector is more important than that of the 
private sector as concerns employment. However, its contribution in terms of 
value added remains far below that of the private sector. For the service sectors 
no equivalent figures are available. Private firms dominate in the activities 
fundamental for the export oriented strategy. They are strong notably in light 
industries, including consumer goods, where the immediate prospects for 
increased exports are. And the importance of private banks has increased in the 
1980s, as the financial system has been liberalized. Moreover, emerging and 
expanding service activities, such as advertising, consultancy, auditing, tourism, 
or foreign trade, are undertaken mainly by private firms.
Value Added Employment
Private 5 2,4% 16,5%
Private 405 28,8% 30,9%
Public 95 4,9% 38,6%
500 largest 33,7% 69,5%
Source: ISO, Tiirkiye’nin 500 Biiyuk Sanayii Kurulusu, Istanbul: ISO (1990); 
SIS, Statistical Yearbook (1990).
Table 3. Contribution to Manufacturing VA and Employment of the 500 Largest 
Manufacturing Firms in 1988
The holdings occupy a particular place in the Turkish private sector 
landscape. As can be seen in table 3, the 500 largest firms are responsible for 
one third of industrial production and some 70% of employment, a substantial 
part of which are provided by the large private firms.64 Average figures on the 
weight of the private sector do not adequately account for the weight of the 
holdings in the economy. Any of the main holdings comprises several of 
Turkey’s largest private firms.65 In many product sub-sectors, the largest 
firm(s)—usually belonging to holdings—have oligopoly positions.66
In short, the success of any economic policy is dependent upon investment-, 



























































































Turkey Probing a New Model ? 17
sector is particularly important for the current export strategy. The choice of an 
outward oriented liberal economic policy which places private enterprise at the 
centre of the stage has made the dependence of economic policies on the private 
sector more visible.
Private Firms as Policy-Makers
Private business backing for economic policies is even more indispensable in 
the Turkish context, where businessmen are part and parcel of the policy 
making process. The weight of business on policy-making has been used to 
explain the failure of the import substituting policies. The Turkish state became 
increasingly entangled in the politics of, and overwhelmed with, the demands 
from the private sector, to the point where it "was deprived of its ability to 
produce coherent policies."67 Once the foreign exchange crisis of the late 
1970s had eliminated the rents (foreign exchange allocations, favourable 
interests), the state could no handle its relations with private business. In the 
1980s, the liberal economic policies have made this influence even more 
pronounced.
In Turkey the relations between the state and the private sector are marked 
by extensive clientela relations (clientela is a euphemism for corruption).66 
These relations are based on an elaborate set of loyalties (regional, social, 
personal and interest based) linking politicians and businessmen. The clientela 
relations are fuelled by the considerable personal overlap between private firms 
and the top level of the state administration.69 The overlap has increased with 
the liberalization program as personalities from the private sector have become 
acceptable and even encouraged to take up public employment. Inversely, and 
more conventionally, firms usually employ insiders from the administration of 
closest concern (often a retired employee) to advice on administrative matters, 
they have "their man."70 The extent to which the links between the private and 
the public influence policy-making can hardly be overestimated. First, they 
serve as informal transmission belts of ideas between private and public sphere. 
Second, the links are used by the government to favour firms in their support 
and disadvantaging other. Thus, Cavit Qaglar (DYP) came out in the press 
promising worried businessmen who had supported ANAP that their credits 
would not be cut.71 Third, businessmen use their contacts in the administration 
to favour their points. The bankers e.g. made Qaglar their spokesman for 
expressing grievances with the government’s financial policies.72 Qaglar’s 




























































































measures) appeared both as an extension of a broader conflict opposing (Jaglar 
and Ms. Qiller and as one of the causes deepening the dispute.
In addition to their personal influence, businessmen are closely involved in 
policy-making through their professional associations.73 New ideas and 
information often come to the government and to the administration from the 
private sector professional organizations. One illustration is the initiative of the 
OSD (Automotive Producers’ Association) pushing for the creation of an 
environmental fund. Its aim is to further the compliance of Turkish automobile 
producers to international standards. Having an agency informing about and 
sanctioning the implementation of these standards appeared to be a precondition 
of the development of exports.74 In some cases professional associations 
entirely take over policy-making. The Istanbul Textile Exporters’ Union 
distributes and negotiates textile quotas. Likewise, the Turkish Clothing 
Manufacturers’ Association distributes part of the official funds for encouraging 
participation in international fairs and events.
The political influence of businessmen on policy making has been intensified 
by the liberal economic policies. Businessmen’s ideas, suggestions, and requests 
no longer "reach" the government but are requested by it in name of the 
dialogue with the private sector. This dialogue takes place both through the 
personal relations linking higher civil servants and politicians with businessmen 
and through the numerous voluntary and compulsory professional organizations. 
Therefore, the process of formulating policies and of elaborating them has to be 
thought of as directly linked to the ideas circulating among businessmen.
Private Firms Confining Legitimacy
In addition to their influence on the process of policy making itself, 
businessmen are increasingly inclined to, and capable of, questioning the 
legitimacy of government. In part their increased influence on the legitimacy of 
economic policies is the reflection the government’s vulnerability. However, the 
wide national and international audience of businessmen is also important. The 
"international business civilisation with scientists as priests and efficiency as 
religion" has made it acceptable for business elite to express itself on a wide 
range of matters.75 Thus, in Turkey the government-businessmen dialogue has 
become the main public form of debate over economic policies.
One explanation for the coalition’s sensitivity to criticism by businessmen 
is its general vulnerability. As the change of the distribution of seats in 



























































































Turkey Probing a New Model ? 19
prone to split up. 18 Kurdish deputies have resigned from the SHP in different 
steps as a consequence of the persistent failure of the government to deal with 
the situation in the South East in other ways than military. Moreover, the 
recreation of the "Atatiirkist" Republican People’s Party (CHP, banned in 1980) 
drew out 18 deputies more from the SHP. There is, however, more to the 
coalition’s frailty than intricate disputes in leftists groups. The coalition suffers 
from being based mainly on disagreement with a common enemy (the ANAP) 
rather than on a common program based on a common understanding of social 
and economic issues. It has been remarkably slow in designing policies dealing 
with the issues raised in the electoral campaign (human rights, political 
liberalisation and income distribution). In this context, private business critique 







DYP - True Path Party 59 179 178
ANAP - Mother Land Party 292 112 95
SHP - Social Democrat Populist Party 99 91 52
RP - Welfare Party (religious) 0 61 40
DSP - Democratic Left Party 0 7 3
MQP - National Endeavour Party (nationalist) 0 with
RP
13
Independent (mainly ANAP elected resign after 
30.11.92 convention, and M()P)
0 0 24
CHP - Peoples Republican Party (recreated in - mainly 
SHP elected)
- - 21
HEP - Peoples Labour Party (Kurdish party - SHP 
elected)
- - 18
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report, 1991/4 and 1993/1. 
Table 4. Distribution of Seats in Parliament
However, at least as important as the weakness of the coalition is the 
increasing strength and improved organization of private business and notably 
their direct communication with the public opinion. The private sector use of 




























































































cunningly cultivates the popular idea that governments are less capable of 
designing economic policies than the representatives of the private sector.77 It 
makes a point of being active in public debates and therefore uses mass-media 
extensively and has a correspondingly strong impact on public opinion. It e.g. 
planned a series of television programs with the explicit intention to promote 
a better understanding of economic problems and the image of the association, 
"not only as an association of the big business, but as an association which 
thinks a lot about the interests of the country, which makes research and studies 
the result of which are communicated to the public opinion."78 TUSIAD is not 
the only representative of the private sector to use public opinion (via media) 
to pressure contest the government. Rather, a myriad of specialized, regional, 
an voluntary associations undertake similar activities on a smaller scale all over 
the country. The recently created the Union of Foundations (Vakiflar Birligi) for 
instance, aims at pressuring the political parties for attention to activities of the 
private sector and to create a "well informed and sensible public opinion."79 
Also businessmen as individuals, have taken the place of public figures, if not 
heros. Their memoirs abounding with advice to their fellow citizen, become 
best-sellers. Photographs of social events involving private sector personalities 
(charity activities, weddings, and parties) adorn the front pages of the daily 
press (including papers on the left). Their frequent statements and comments on 
issues ranging from family morals to foreign policy are also faithfully related 
and receive as much attention if not more as those of any politician.
The influence of the private sector on policy legitimacy is further amplified 
by its international audience. The government has to sell its image abroad to 
satisfy its creditors and attract/maintain foreign investors and the private sector 
has considerable influence over this image. TUSIAD and the group it represents 
have extensive relations with foreign business men and organizations. TUSIAD 
is consulted by international organizations and participates in negotiations with 
foreign creditors. Moreover, private business has extensive international 
contacts. The TUSIAD organizes seminars and on numerous publications. Its 
economic year-book has become one of the reference works on the Turkish 
economy. Since the "favourable investment / business climate" investors and 
creditors look for is never entirely objective, private sector opinions regarding 
the soundness of the government’s policies can have considerable influence on 
the international level independently of economic results.
The businessmen’s impact on the legitimacy of economic policies is perhaps 
best measured by the strong reactions their declarations provoke on behalf of 



























































































Turkey Probing a New Model ? 21
answers. The tone of the answers evidently varies. However, "divide and rule" 
is a devise often used as politicians try to stage one part of the private business 
community against another. For instance, in a message to the press Demirel 
came out harshly against the TUSIAD, arguing that an association with so little 
representativity had no right to criticise. Playing on the rivalry between the 
TOBB80 and the TUSIAD Demirel argued that the more representative TOBB 
should be the true representative of the private sector.81 If TUSIAD wished to 
participate in politics, Demirel ironically suggested, that it create a political 
party, a Businessmen’s Party.82
To sum up, the influence of private businessmen and particularly of the large 
holdings on policy making in Turkey is significant and has been increasing 
during the 1980s. The grip of economic liberalism on Turkish and international 
public has given weight to the opinions of businessmen. Private business can 
contest the legitimacy of both "faces" of Turkish economic policies: the one 
aiming at the maintenance of the political coalition and the one aimed at the 
international community.83 Businessmen play an important role in policy­
making both as individual and as a groups. And they have a central role in the 
economy which the structural adjustment policies has reinforced.
Conclusion
This paper began with the question of how viable redistributive economic 
policies are. It has argued both against the claim that international structures 
make welfarist policies impossible (outside-in dependency) and against the 
claim that neo-liberal policies are necessary because of international competition 
(neo-liberal market determinism). We started by showing why the DYP-SHP 
coalition adopted an economic model where income distribution holds an 
important place and why this policy made the government impinge on the 
privileges of the large private firms and allow more space for trade-union 
activity and possible wage increases. We then argued that this policy does not 
inevitably lead to an irresolvable dilemma between internal policy priorities and 
international competitive imperatives. Rather the imperatives of international 
competition are used to black-mail policy-makers. We finally showed that the 
real issue is the political agreement around the new model. The business 
community’s support is crucial to this agreement. It has an extensive impact on 
policy-making which can only be understood transnationally. The structural 
adjustment programme, the wave of international liberalism and the international 
audience of the private sector are at the origin of their influence. The role of 




























































































counterparts) will not be able to "discipline" the business community to go 
along with its policies.84 Consequently, the fate of the new economic model 
depends on the private sector’s collaboration.
In Turkey a modus vivendi between the private sector and the government 
on economic policies is not excluded. The TUSIAD has made "social 
reconciliation" a leading theme since the DYP-SHP coalition came to power. 
Yet, businessmen have so far been conspicuously unwilling to accept 
reconciliation if it entails that labour is given a stronger voice and social 
inequities compensated for by redistribution through taxation. This is making 
"social reconciliation" difficult. Most of the coalition’s ambitions in terms of 
political rights and revisions of the labour regulations have remained on the 
shelf. Already in October 1993, Turk-i§ felt obliged to remind the government 
of the engagements taken in March, by presenting a rights and freedoms 
package asking it to implement the law changes to conform with ILO 
standards.85 And the Islamic "Welfare Party" came out as the victor of the 
March 27 1994 local elections after a campaign for a "just order" stressing 
among other things economic distribution. Both indicate growing disillusion. 
The government, in turn, has moved away from its promises and intentions. On 
5 April 1994 it adopted a stabilisation package which places welfarist policies 
still further away. The prospects for a social conciliation in Turkey therefore 
seem uncertain as do the future of the welfarist policies.
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